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Abstract
Discussion of legislation of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, often euphemisti-
cally called ‘assisted dying’, frequently focuses on individual cases promoted by cam-
paigners as the reason that the law to licence doctors to supply lethal drugs to patients 
requesting them should change under certain conditions. But such legislation has wider 
consequences that simply for a handful of cases, as the relentlessly increasing numbers 
of such deaths have shown.
Keywords: assisted dying, physician assisted suicide, euthanasia, religion, legalisation, 
Parliament
1. Introduction
Current law in the United Kingdom and in most parts of the world is crystal clear. There is an 
absolute prohibition on killing another person, and it is illegal to help someone take their own 
life. But society’s prohibition on assisting suicide has become eroded. Fear of dying has been 
publicised, with premature death being portrayed as a preferable option to a natural death with 
all care given. And there have been challenges to the clinical boundaries of care through court 
challenges about the cessation of interventions in some patients in minimally conscious states.
Against this backdrop campaigners for assisted suicide and euthanasia have mounted large 
media campaigns, which have gained some traction in increasingly secular and utilitarian 
societies. A general perception of ‘better off dead’ has fallen into common parlance, and yet 
the reality of death has become increasingly unfamiliar to people as the majority of deaths 
occur in hospitals out of sight of family and friends. Additionally, there has been relatively 
little publicity about improvements end-of-life care.
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Assisted dying is a recently coined term that covers physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and phy-
sician administered euthanasia (PAE). Wherever such acts have been legalised, they all aim 
to achieve the same goal: they licence doctors to prescribe lethal drugs to people who request 
them, with certain criteria being stipulated. But it becomes important to unpick exactly what 
is meant by the broad blanket term ‘assisted dying’. Various laws or proposed laws around 
the world have used the phrase in their title.
In 1998, the US State of Oregon enacted the ‘Death with Dignity Act’ (DWDA) [1]. California’s 
recent ‘End of Life Option Act’ [2], and now Canada’s ‘Medical Assistance in Dying Act’ imply 
that without the option of assisted suicide or euthanasia, death will be far worse than if life is 
abruptly foreshortened [3]. The Dutch in 2001, with commendable honesty in its title, passed 
their ‘Termination of life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act’ [4]–the title of the legislation 
describes exactly what the legislation does.
The problem with titles that are themselves euphemisms is that the public are misled, as are 
politicians, over what exactly legislation can and cannot do and over potential unintended 
consequences of it.
One difficulty is that criteria in legislation, intended to define clearly who is or is not eligible 
for such lethal drugs, are of themselves open to wide interpretation and some are based on 
flawed assumptions.
However, before the law is changed, it is necessary to ask whether there is compelling evi-
dence that the law needs to be changed and that the benefits of such a change outweigh the 
adverse consequences of legal change. Such legislation alters the focus and ethics of clinical 
decision-making, it alters society’s approach to those who for whatever reason are seeking 
suicide and it alters a fundamental moral code in society that one person should not deliber-
ately bring about the death of another.
2. The law
In most countries in the world, there is a clear prohibition on assisting suicide. 
Suicide is regarded as a very grave matter. Despair that drives someone to suicide requires a 
response of trying to support that person, as embodied in suicide prevention policies. These 
laws recognise the duty on all in society and also recognise the vulnerability of the profoundly 
depressed person with suicidal ideation to coercive pressures on them, however subtle, to 
think they would indeed be ‘better off dead’. Linked to that is the compassionate approach to 
the person who attempts suicide and fails–suicide per se is not a criminal offence.
Historically, this was not the case and suicide itself was viewed as self-murder, carrying with 
it the opprobrium of society. However, by 1961, the UK, as well as many other countries, had 
recognised the inhumanity of such a law that left those who survived attempting suicide to 
be potentially prosecuted for the actions their despair had driven them to. And it also recog-
nised that society was failing such people if it did not tackle the source of despair, usually 
severe psychiatric depression, and that suicide prevention policies needed to be strengthened. 
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This led to the 1961 Suicide Act [5], which decriminalised suicide but deliberately did not 
legalise it, because legalisation would have brought the stamp of approval on suicide itself. 
Parliament was very clear that suicide should remain a very grave action and one that society 
has a duty to do all possible to prevent such actions, and respect life itself. But Parliament also 
recognised, in decriminalizing suicide, that criminal sanctions were no way to treat and sup-
port those in urgent need of psychiatric help.
By the end of the twentieth century, new sources of coercion to suicide had emerged as inter-
net suicide sites goaded vulnerable young people to commit suicide; some such sites even had 
voyeuristic onlookers as the person died [6]. To meet these changing societal pressures, the 
Coroners and Justice Act in 2009 [7] amended the wording of the 1961 Suicide Act, to broaden 
the scope of the offence from that of ‘aiding and abetting suicide’ to the wider offence of 
‘encouraging or assisting suicide’.
Although this offence carries with it a maximum sentence of 14 years, it carries no minimum 
sentence that the courts must apply if a person is found guilty. Prosecutions for assisting sui-
cide also require the agreement of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to proceed. The 
process of deciding whether or not to prosecute a person for assisting a suicide was clarified 
in 2010, when the then Director of Public Prosecutions was required by the House of Lords 
acting in its previous judicial role, which is now the Supreme Court to publish his guidance 
on prosecuting such acts. This clarified that there is a two-stage test that must be satisfied 
for a prosecution to proceed: first, there must evidence that the suspect did an act capable of 
and intended to encourage or assist suicide and second that such a prosecution is in the pub-
lic interest. The factors which may tend towards prosecution and those tending to mitigate 
against prosecution were published at that time and were further clarified in 2014 [8]. Since 
then, the number of cases referred to the DPP has remained small with 124 cases referred to the 
DPP in the 7 years from 2009 to 2016 and the law continues to act as an effective deterrent to 
such actions. Because the two-stage test must be fulfilled, among these cases 102 did not pro-
ceed, because 24 were withdrawn by the police and in 78 cases the Crown Prosecution Service 
decided not to proceed. In some of these the assistance was given out of extreme compassion 
after trying all avenues to dissuade the person from their suicidal course of action. Among the 
remaining cases, six cases proceeded to prosecution for homicide or similar serious crime [9].
This prosecutorial discretion is not unique to the law on assisting suicide; it is the way the law 
works. Non-prosecuting does not mean the law is not working, it means the law sets clear cri-
teria, people know what they are and when the law is breached the circumstances pertaining 
to the situation will be examined–in other words, the law has a stern face but an understand-
ing heart. Take another example, a person stealing at gunpoint for personal gain can expect 
to be dealt with harshly, whereas a mother stealing food to feed her hungry child might well 
be dealt with quite differently, but no one is proposing a law to exempt certain types of theft 
from potential prosecution.
The law itself lays down a clear black and white line about what is acceptable and what is not; 
it sends social messages. It is the interpretation of the law that is then circumstance specific.
This messaging is evident in the numbers of deaths from ‘assisted dying’ seen in jurisdictions 
that have legalised such practices and where figures suggest a normalisation of the practice is 
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Figure 1. Oregon’s number of lethal prescriptions issued and deaths from lethal drugs recorded as being under the 
Death with Dignity Act [10].
Figure 2. Deaths reported as deaths under the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide legislation in the 
Netherlands [11].
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occurring. The contrast illustrates that the law is not being abused in England and Wales and 
is working as it should.
The numbers of such deaths vary depending on what exactly has been legalised, what the 
criteria are against which requests for lethal drugs are judged, and how requests are  handled. 
But overall the numbers in each jurisdiction that has legalised some form of ‘assisted dying’ 
have been seen to increase overall year on year and have not reached a plateau anywhere 
(Figures 1–3).
3. What is ‘assisted dying’?
‘Assisted dying’ is a euphemism that usually is interpreted as meaning physician-assisted suicide 
(PAS) or physician-administered euthanasia (PAE) of a person deemed to be terminally ill or who 
has unbearable suffering. The way that death is brought about is by administering a massive 
dose lethal drugs; it is unrelated to cessation of a futile treatment . Nor is it the doctrine of double 
effect, which is a serious adverse event from a therapeutic dose of drug, not a deliberate overdose.
For PAS, the person is prescribed a lethal dose of barbiturate, usually after preloading with an 
antiemetic to prevent the drug being vomited back. Such barbiturate doses are massive–about 
50 times a dose that might be used in therapeutic practice–and such barbiturates themselves 
are very rarely used clinically today.
For PAE, the clinician, usually a doctor, injects a dose of an anaesthetic agent to induce coma. 
Then if the patient does not stop breathing and die rapidly, this is followed by a dose of 
Figure 3. Deaths in Belgium reported as due to euthanasia [12, 13].
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 pancuronium or a similar paralysing agent so that the patient is completely paralysed and 
dies of asphyxia.
Although these might seem gratuitous details, they are important to understand the process 
and intent in PAS and PAE, in contrast to treatment withdrawal.
4. Treatment withdrawal
When a treatment fails to achieve its therapeutic goal, or the burdens of the intervention out-
weigh possible benefits, it becomes futile. This situation is common in oncology when cancer 
escapes from the effects of chemotherapy and progresses in the face of attempted treatment.
In some circumstances, the patient may decide that enough is enough and withdraw consent 
to ongoing treatment, preferring instead to let nature take its course, while other patients 
may wish an intervention to cease and are in effect withdrawing consent for the intervention. 
Thus, the patient on a ventilator with advancing motor neuron disease (amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis) and no possibility of improvement may decide to opt for ventilation withdrawal.
In each case, the disease process is killing the patient and their death would probably already 
have occurred were it not for the intervention–they are dying of their disease, not because 
they are being given a lethal dose of drugs to deliberately foreshorten a life that may have 
otherwise gone on for months or years. During their dying care must not cease, so it is com-
pletely appropriate to titrate medication as required to keep the patient comfortable and 
with good symptom control. But massive lethal overdoses of drugs are not used and not 
needed.
Another misconception is that medical science is now keeping many more people alive than 
previously. It is nutrition, general hygiene measures and control of epidemics through vac-
cination and other public health measures that have contributed far more to longevity than 
interventions on those who are already ill. But when illness strikes, better control of disease is 
certainly possible now compared to 50 years ago. Control of diabetes, statins in heart disease 
and thrombolysis of strokes has led to far better clinical outcomes than were previously pos-
sible. Now, the greatest societal threat to health is probably the obesity epidemic and associ-
ated chronic conditions that result in multiple comorbidities [14].
As for medical intervention keeping people alive longer, the evidence is complex. People are 
certainly surviving under conditions that would have killed them in the past but they are 
also surviving better, able to resume activities of living and for some illnesses, such as breast 
cancer, the disease has gone from being a death sentence to being a long-term condition, often 
with very long periods of remission or cure.
Improvements in general health have resulted in altered expectations in the public, fuelled 
by political promises in a consumerist society, which have led people to be less tolerant of 
debility in any form and an expectation that the healthcare system can solve the problems 
that are almost inevitable from lifestyle-induced disorders, ranging from tobacco and alcohol 
consumption, the misuse of antibiotics leading to antibiotic resistance and and obesity.
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In general, the advances in medical science are allowing people to live much better for much 
longer than previously. Medical science is helping people live better and longer.
5. Criteria for assisted suicide
Different eligibility legislatures have used different criteria in their laws. It is worth examin-
ing these as there are difficulties with the verifiability of each criterion and therefore of the 
ability to detect if the legislation has been breached.
Importantly for patients, decisions must be based on accurate information, the patients must 
have the capacity to make that particular decision, and for a decision to be valid it must also 
be made free from coercion. Thus, the patient deciding to seek PAS/PAE must know the diag-
nosis is correct, the prognosis is accurate and they must be making the decision completely 
voluntarily.
5.1. Terminal illness diagnosis and prognosis
The majority of serious and progressing illnesses can eventually lead to death, but it is dif-
ficult to predict when death will occur in an individual. Metastatic malignant disease, with 
expanding deposits of malignant tumour, is relatively easy to detect and where that tumour 
is adjacent to a vital structure such as the spinal cord, an artery or a major airway, it is reason-
able to predict that progression will result in further deterioration. Even in cancer, prediction 
of life expectancy – the ‘how long have I got? question – is only at best be an informed guess 
and may be inaccurate by months or even years [15]. All too often clinicians overestimate 
or underestimate prognosis, leading to stories of ‘they gave me three months, and here I 
am years later’. Although prognostic indicators in disease have been repeatedly shown to 
be grossly unreliable [16], Oregon’s legislation requires a prognosis of 6 months, whereas 
Canada’s legislation simply requires a doctor to state that death is likely to occur in the rea-
sonably foreseeable future.
5.2. Mental capacity
For each decision, a person makes–and none could be greater than the decision to end your 
life prematurely–the mental capacity to make the decision must not be impaired. This means 
the person should not only be free of an illness or disorder of the mind that impairs their deci-
sion making, but also have the ability to understand the information relevant to that decision, 
be able to retain it and weigh it up in the decision-making process and be able to communicate 
this decision. In England and Wales, that is laid out in the Mental Capacity Act of 2005; there 
is similar legislation in Scotland and some other countries [17].
Such legislation aims to protect people from coercion and ensures that clinicians are under a 
duty to communicate in a way that the patients can understand. Physicians are also under a 
duty to do all they can to maximise the person’s mental capacity, by treating reversible condi-
tions, such as infection, and minimising the adverse effects of medications that impair capacity.
‘Assisted Dying’: A View of the Legal, Social, Ethical and Clinical Perspectives
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/65908
Evidence from Oregon shows that clinical depression, which leads to a particularly hopeless 
perspective and impairs capacity for decisions about life and death, is often not detected in 
assessments undertaken for PAS. Depression of itself is known to be a powerful force driving 
a desire for death [18], and depression and hopelessness are mutually reinforcing indepen-
dent predictors of those seeking to hasten death [19]. In a small, but well conducted study 
one in six of those who fulfilled the assessment criteria for PAS in Oregon were found to have 
an undiagnosed, and therefore untreated, clinical depression; these patients were in the sub-
group that then proceeded to take their own lives with lethal drugs [20].
Mental illness is frequent in seriously ill patients [21]. Suicidal thoughts have been found to 
occur in up to 45% of cancer patients but they usually do not persist [22]. Linked to this is the 
repeated clinical experience that patients react differently at different times in their illness; 
despair and overwhelming hopelessness can give way to hope and joy in the most unexpected 
circumstances [23].
5.3. No coercion
Coercive pressures are particularly difficult to detect. Clinicians do not know what goes on 
behind closed doors in people’s homes. Coercion can be external, coming from comments 
that range from overheard comments through to obvious complaints about the burden the 
person’s illness is posing on the family financially, physically and/or emotionally.
Fear of being a burden has been shown in Oregon’s data over 17 years to be the second most 
frequently cited reason that people seek to hasten death through PAS. The perception of being 
a burden is itself associated with a desire for hastened death; it correlates more highly with 
psychological problems and existential concerns than it does with physical symptoms or dif-
ficulties [24].
Even more difficult to detect is internal coercion–the person who does not want to be a bur-
den to the family, who is fearful of what lies ahead, perhaps who witnessed a badly managed 
death many years previously and is haunted by such memories, who is frightened of being 
undignified, confused or incontinent. Some people are unable to recognise the inherent uncer-
tainly of life and seek to control everything around them. For them, the loss of control to a 
disease, which has taken over their body and is destroying their very existence, is something 
they cannot countenance. These people are often high achievers in life, have higher education 
and well-paid jobs and are used to being in command [25].
6. Clinical compassion
Campaigners cite ‘compassion for the dying person’ as the main driver behind demands for 
PAS and/or PAE, which are portrayed as the way to relieve the suffering person of their suf-
fering. The argument has traction with the public who are fearful of pain and fearful of an 
existence in which they are not in control.
But amongst those who have availed themselves of lethal drugs to end their lives, Oregon’s 
Health Department’s reports show that pain comes low on the list of reasons given [10]. The 
Bioethics - Medical, Ethical and Legal Perspectives222
main reasons given by these patients relate to existential issues, particularly being less able to 
engage in activities making life enjoyable (96.2%) and losing autonomy (92.4%).
There is an argument put forward that the difference between the terminally ill seeking sui-
cide and others seeking suicide is that the terminally ill do not want to die but they recognise 
their impending death as inevitable and they wish to avoid suffering when dying. This would 
seem at first sight logical, but the difficulty is the inability to define who is truly facing death, 
and who, despite serious illness, can resume living well with the appropriate support. The 
acceptance of the inevitably of death and that disease will take its course to that death, is 
fundamentally different from deciding that because death seems an imminent possibility, the 
remainder of life, however long it is, should be dispensed with.
Some campaigners say that PAS/PAE is only intended to be available for those in the last days 
of life but they have not fashioned a legislative proposal that restricts requests to the period 
that appears to be the last days or weeks, such as the anticipated last 4 weeks of life, when 
prognostication stands a chance of being slightly less inaccurate. [15].
7. Autonomy
The concept of personal autonomy is also a cornerstone of arguments for legalisation of 
PAS/PAE. The argument is made that it is for a person and for them alone to decide the time 
and manner of their death. And so it may be, but that does not explain why another person 
(a clinician in most cases) should be involved in bringing about that death. Nor does it rec-
ognise that ‘no man is an island’; we affect those around us and the very nature of society is 
that we are interdependent for our existence and indeed for our survival. As Onora O’Neill 
has pointed out, autonomy is relational [26].
It is important to recognise that the way a person dies can have profound and devastating 
effects on those left behind. Take the child whose mother opted for assisted suicide and 
who was then left feeling that his love for her was inadequate, that he had failed her by not 
being ‘good enough’ to give her a reason to live; such a sense of guilt is inconsolable and 
irreconcilable.
8. Dignity
Concerns about loss of dignity are also frequently given as the reason for PAS/PAE being 
better for a person than continued living. As Cicely Saunders said ‘Dignity is having a sense 
of personal worth’ [27] and Chochinov’s work has shown that the way a person is treated by 
others either enhances that sense of personhood and worth, or undermines it [28].
Laws termed ‘Death with Dignity Act’ have an inherently misleading title as they imply 
that PAS of itself confers dignity on the dying person. Such an assumption is misleading. 
Care of the dying is not rated as highly in these countries as it is in the UK [29], where no 
such PAS/PAE legislation is in place and where palliative care developments have led the 
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rest of the world in care of the dying [30]. Such perceptions that dignity in dying is syn-
onymous with PAS/PAE mislead those other legislatures and societies considering such 
legislation, as well as subtly coercing patients who are wrestling with making decisions 
about their own lives.
9. Dying in society
As dying at home has become increasingly unusual, people have lost familiarity with dying 
and with death. The media, by its very nature, needs to capture viewers and listeners’ atten-
tion with dramatic stories, hence the portrayal of unusual and dramatic deaths. By contrast, 
the thousands upon thousands of peaceful well-managed deaths that occur year in year out 
do not make headlines. The apparently well-managed death of David Bowie was an excep-
tion, because he was such a well-known figure, so his death was spoken about widely and 
opened conversations on death and dying.
The numbers of people who have not made any preparations for their own death, such as 
making a will, may be a reflection of fear of the unknown and a sense of denial about the 
reality of their own mortality. In the UK a charity, Dying Matters, has been promoting open 
conversations across society; the majority of those engaging in the conversation are people 
who are recently bereaved or had an exceptional experience of care–either good or bad–and 
want to talk. This lack of familiarity with dying has led to increased searching for quick solu-
tions to complex problems, rather than a recognition that we all live with uncertainty all the 
time and that there are often unexpected moments of great value and tenderness as life draws 
to a close, if dying is planned for, accepted, and managed well.
10. Pain
Societal attitudes to death and how it should be managed have shifted over recent years, 
with the development of the hospice movement emanating from the UK and now adopted to 
greater or lesser extends around the globe. Despite advances in the science of end of life care, 
long-perpetuated myths about opioids have meant that these essential pain-relieving drugs 
remain unavailable to about 80% of the world’s population. Even in those countries with 
legislation that enables good analgesic prescribing, misconceptions about how to prescribe 
such analgesics safely have led to many patients receiving inadequate analgesia to fulfil their 
needs. This is then witnessed by relatives, who are traumatised at seeing the person they love 
in ongoing pain.
The solution to the problem is to rapidly improve analgesic use and educate profession-
als about what pain management. As Robert Twycross has said ‘you do not need to kill the 
patient to kill the pain’ [31]. But in a search for a solution those who are unaware of what can 
and should be done have resorted to feeling that pain in dying patients is an unsurmountable 
problem to which the solution is to end the life of the sufferer.
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11. Society normalisation
In those legislatures that have PAS and/or PAE, marked changes can be seen in attitudes 
to death and dying, with an inexorable increase in the numbers of premature deaths 
through the ingestion or administration of prescribed lethal drugs. In effect, this method 
of death has become normalised rather than being an exceptional event. The numbers 
have increased year on year, as can be seen with an 80% increase over the last 2 years in 
Oregon, with an eightfold increase in numbers since the ‘Death with Dignity Act’ came 
into force (see Figure 1). Although the absolute numbers seem small, 132 PAS deaths 
reported in 2015, Oregon has a very small population of only 3.8 million, which is less 
than half that of London.
But other changes have emerged associated with this legal change. The economic pressures 
of healthcare around the globe have impinged, as almost inevitably they will, on the way 
such decisions are viewed and reports have emerged of subtle coercive effects, whereby 
the costs of treatments are not funded but the far lower cost of PAS is covered by health 
 insurance [32].
The effect on the clinical relationship between doctor and patients needs recognising too. In 
Oregon, there is evidence of doctor shopping, with one physician writing 27 prescriptions for 
lethal drugs last year even though the majority of doctors wrote none. This change reflects the 
process whereby patients whose doctors do not think they should have PAS are then being 
steered towards and assessed by physicians who do not know them as patients beyond their 
case notes and who have shown themselves to be more willing to prescribe lethal drugs than 
others.
In the Netherlands, numbers of PAE/PAS deaths are far higher than in Oregon and most 
are by PAE, where last year a death rate from PAE/PAS of 1 in 26 of all deaths (all causes) 
was reported. This may reflect several factors. Firstly, the law does not restrict the criteria 
to those deemed to be terminally ill, but includes those deemed to be those with intractable 
suffering, whatever the cause. Thus, the assessment is the patients’ description of their suf-
fering and its management, rather than also requiring consideration of the nature of the 
underlying pathological process. It may also reflect that the passive nature of holding out 
an arm for the doctor to inject lethal drugs is emotionally easier than the active gesture of 
raising a glass of lethal drugs and drinking the solution down, or it may reflect a different 
societal approach.
In Belgium, where PAE alone is legalised, the death rate appears even higher, but the statistics 
are harder to verify. Cases widely reported from Belgium include those who could never be 
classified as terminally ill, including the victim of a botched sex change operation, a prisoner 
with depression, twins with progressive visual deterioration towards blindness and several 
patients with long-term psychiatric conditions [33].
For all these cases, the term ‘assisted dying’ is deeply misleading as they were not dying prior 
to the lethal drugs being given. As such, the morality of the term itself warrants exploring. In 
these circumstances, terms such as ‘ending life’ or ‘killing’ would be more accurate descriptors.
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12. Conclusion
Parliaments everywhere are faced with some key questions when changing the law on any-
thing: first, does the law need changing? And second, would whatever legislation replaced its 
be safer overall for the whole population? better overall?
To answer the first question, it is necessary to ask what the problem is that the law is trying 
to solve. Some have argued that palliative care is not a universal panacea and indeed it never 
would be because no treatment or condition management in clinical practice ever has 100% 
success rate; there will always be some people for whom such approaches to their care are 
inadequate. But then the question of unintended consequences for the majority also needs to 
be explored.
At the population level, when Parliaments change the law they need clear facts on which 
to base their planned legislation, rather than be driven by pressure and emotive spin from 
campaign groups. To answer the second question, legislators need to look at the effect on the 
whole tenor of care in society for its vulnerable, the tensions between the costs of health and 
social care, and the duty to provide such care.
Legislators need to consider possible unintended consequences of legislation around PAS/PA 
and should look particularly at the trends from those places that have brought this into clinical 
practice.
Similarly, at the individual level, when patients make decisions over the options facing them, 
they need clear facts including information about the uncertainty around diagnosis, progno-
sis and other options.
For healthcare professionals themselves, there is also a need to honestly review their own 
roles, the financial and time pressures on them and to question their fundamental duty to 
patients.
In this complex debate, there is an increasing need to look at whether the law does need to be 
changed and how such change will alter the moral landscape. To inform that process, the evi-
dence of the effect of legal change cannot be ignored. There is also a need to question whether 
the terms used are honest or misleading and to explore whether there are far safer options for 
patients than to licence doctors to provide lethal drugs when asked to do so.
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